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Migrant workers claims for greater protection in a globalized world are typically 
expressed either in the idiom of international human rights or citizenship. Instead of 
contrasting these two normative frames, the paper explores the extent to which 
human rights and citizenship discourses intersect when it comes to claims by 
migrant workers. An analysis of the international human and labour rights 
instruments that are specifically designed for migrant workers reveals how neither 
discourse questions the assumption of territorial state sovereignty. Drawing upon 
sociological and political approaches to human rights claims, I evaluate the 
Arendtian-inspired critique of international human rights, which is that they ignore 
the very basis “right to have rights.” In doing so, I discuss the different dimensions 
of citizenship, and conclude that international rights can be used by migrant 
workers to assert right claims that reinforce a conception of citizenship that, 
although different from national citizenship, has the potential to address their 
distinctive social location.   
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Introduction  
 Temporary migrant workers exemplify the problem of justice in a globalized 
world.1 In the global North, falling fertility rates, increasing life expectancy, the shift 
from manufacturing to services and changes in the expectations and living standards of 




classified as low-skilled to perform jobs that are dirty, dangerous and degrading. Despite 
this demand, citing concerns that include preserving the integrity of welfare and fiscal 
regimes, the wages and working conditions of national workers, as well as national 
identity and social cohesion, richer, more developed, countries refuse to grant low-skilled 
workers either (immediate) permanent residence or citizenship status.2 In the global 
South, economic trends such as growing inequalities between high- and low-income 
countries and insecurity, vulnerability, and instability due to economic, environmental 
and political crises have increased the numbers of men and women who migrate in order 
to obtain paid work. Remittances are crucial for the survival of household, community 
and country in a large swath of the developing world, and exporting workers is one 
means by which governments cope with unemployment and foreign debt. Although 
national immigration policies have always been very path dependent, shaped by each 
country’s unique history of immigration, there is a convergence internationally towards 
temporary migrant programs (previously known as guest-worker programs but now 
called managed or circular migration) for low-skilled workers (Wickramasekara 2010). 
 A distinctive feature of these temporary, circular or managed migration programs 
for low-skilled workers is that these workers are often not entitled to the same rights as 
workers who are nationals of the host state.3 Typically, migrant workers are subject to a 
range of mobility, employment and residence restrictions in the country in which they are 
working that do not pertain to workers who enjoy either permanent resident or citizenship 
status in the host state. As a matter of international law, sovereign states can, through 
their immigration laws and rules, require particular categories of entrants to have certain 
skills and experience, and place restrictions on the freedoms, privileges, rights and 
entitlements of migrants who enter their territory. Almost all countries use immigration 
law to create a variety of different migration statuses, some of which are highly 
precarious, which in turn generate a differentiated supply of labour that, together with 
migratory processes, produces precarious workers and precarious employment norms 
(Fudge 2012). 
 The territorial jurisdiction of nation states and Westphalian notions of citizenship 
create a mismatch between the scale of justice, which has traditionally been located in the 
nation state, and the structural causes of many injustices in a globalized world (Fraser 




citizenship as a normative discourse when it comes to social justice claims. According to 
this perspective, “legal citizenship or nationality is an expression of global social 
inequality” as its “allocation creates and consolidates unequal life opportunities” (Faist 
2009, p. 7). International human rights are seen a solution to the lack of congruence 
between the demand for justice for migrant workers and a system of governance centred 
on the Westphalian state. International human rights norms, which are invoked and 
applied on the basis of humanity and personhood, are regarded as offering a more 
promising avenue for protecting migrant workers than do claims based upon citizenship, 
a formal legal status that migrant workers do not enjoy in the state in which they are 
working (Basok, Inclan and Noonan 2006, p. 267).  
 By contrast, other theorists, lawyers and activists believe the better route for 
migrant workers (and migrants in general) is to reconceive citizenship on an inclusive 
basis beyond the nation state. Advocates of cosmopolitan or post-national citizenship 
invoke Hannah Arendt’s conception of citizenship as the “right to have rights” in order to 
stretch citizenship beyond the borders of the nation state into the global realm (Arendt 
2004, p. 376). Some scholars emphasize the limitations (or directionality) of human 
rights, and stress instead the political realm of the citizen as the foundation for full 
emancipation (Arendt 2004; Dauvernge and Marsden 2012).  
 Rather than evaluating whether international human rights or cosmopolitan 
citizenship is a more compelling idiom for making claims for greater protections for 
migrant workers in a globalized world, my goal in this paper is to look at the similarities 
and the relationship between the two discourses when it comes to migrant workers’ 
rights. A range of different disciplines – law, political theory and sociology – invokes 
human rights and citizenship discourses in relation to claiming protection for migrant 
workers. Yet, despite much overlap, each discipline uses the terminology of human rights 
and citizenship distinctively. To further complicate matters, it is often unclear the specific 
register – descriptive/analytic or normative/aspirational – within which the vocabulary is 
being used. The proliferation of perspectives and registers contributes to the confusion in 
how the different discourses of human rights and citizenship are being invoked and used 
with respect to migrant workers.   
 In this paper, I will examine how, and the extent to which, human rights and 




focus is exclusively on migrant workers who are part of a recognized managed migration 
program in which the migrant worker’s residence is treated as temporary as a condition of 
entry imposed by the host state.4 This focus allows me to concentrate on official 
immigration policies and migrants who are considered to have a lawful status to reside, 
albeit for a limited duration, in a host state. My concern is with migrant workers who are 
considered by the host state to be low-skilled workers since the migration programs open 
to these workers tend to impose greater restrictions on the migrants rights that programs 
designed to attract high-skilled workers (Ruhs and Martin 2008). I am interested in these 
workers because there has been less attention to their claims and the normative language 
they invoke than there has been to migrants (such as the sans papiers) who do not have 
the requisite legal status to reside in the country in which they work.5  
 I begin by briefly sketching the relationship between international human rights 
and cosmopolitan citizenship. Once I have shown the connection between these two 
forms of claims making, I will examine where migrant workers fit within the 
international human rights instruments, focusing on those instruments specifically 
designed for migrant workers. My perspective is descriptive and analytic. At the first part 
of the paper, I will introduce the critique of international human rights for migrant that 
they are unable to address the foundational problem of the “right to have rights”.  In the 
second part, I will discuss two instances of this critique, and use them as a jumping off 
point for a critical evaluation of Hannah Arendt’s problematic in relation to migrant 
workers. My assessment draws upon Jean Cohen’s disaggregation of the 
incommensurable components of citizenship and Jacques Rancière’s critique of Arendt’s 
understanding of the “Rights of Man.” I conclude that the practice of human rights 
claiming by migrant workers is a valuable supplement to citizenship discourses is the 
goal is to improve the ability of migrant workers to achieve their life projects. 
 
 
I. The Relationship between International Human Rights and Cosmopolitan 
Citizenship  
 There is a close, and deepening, relationship between human rights and 
citizenship. Both are exemplary normative discourses for claims making in the twentieth 




they share a commitment to equality (Nash 2009, p. 1068). Their attractiveness as 
discourses of claims making is closely associated with the fact that both are momentum 
concepts with a universalistic logic that includes an ever-widening circle of people and 
claims under their compass.  
 John Hoffman  (2004, p. 12) defines momentum concepts as “infinitely 
progressive and egalitarian: they have not stopping point and cannot be realized.” He 
contrasts momentum concepts with static concepts, which “are repressively hierarchical 
and divisive” (Ibid.). While freedom, autonomy and citizenship are examples of the 
former, state, patriarchy and violence are instances of the latter.6 Momentum concepts 
have an historical dynamic “which means they must be built upon and continuously 
transcended” (Ibid.). They “unfold” in a manner that requires their ceaseless reworking to 
they realize “more and more their egalitarian and anti-hierarchical potential’ (Ibid, p. 
138).  
 Citizenship exemplifies the progressive and inclusive dynamic of momentum 
concepts (Ibid., p. 13). Human rights also partake in this logic, expanding both in scope 
and substance. Not only are they homologous, citizenship is often defined in terms of 
concentric circles of rights that expand outwards.  Claims to citizenship have enlarged not 
only the types of rights – from civil and political to social and economic – included 
within the rubric of citizenship, but also who counts as a citizen. During the twentieth 
century, both civil and social rights were gradually extended to people, such as women, 
ethnic minorities, and migrants, who had hitherto been considered to be members of 
marginal populations. The normative force of the expansion of the personal scope of 
citizenship, which was driven by political struggles, was reinforced by the international 
human rights regime that was constructed after World War II. The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights established a new form of legitimation for nation states under the rule 
of law, which is adherence to international human rights. Like citizenship, expanding 
circles of “marginalized groups struggling for social justice” invoke human rights (Lister 
2007, p. 49). In highly developed countries, the judiciary played a strategic role in 
establishing the rights of refugees and migrants by reference to international human rights 
instruments (Benhabib 2004). 
 At the same times as international human rights added momentum to the 




universal aspect of human rights threw into sharp contrast the extent to which citizenship 
is confined to the boundaries of the nation state. The tension between the inclusionary 
and exclusionary sides of citizenship is an increasing focus of study (Bosniak 2006; 
Fudge 2004). In fact, “much of the contemporary citizenship literature is marked by the 
challenge it poses to citizenship’s exclusionary tendencies and by its attempt to make real 
citizenship’s inclusionary promise” (Lister 2007, p. 49). 
 The attempt to construct an inclusive cosmopolitan citizenship is intertwined with 
the international human rights regimes. Cosmopolitan citizenship seeks to extend 
democracy and claims making beyond the nation-state (Held 1995). New institutions, 
“which are autonomous and independent” of the nation-state framework and “whose 
legitimacy is derived from the universal rights of the global citizens” must be devised 
(Chandler 2003, p. 334). For such cosmopolitanists, democracy must be “extended from 
the nation to humankind as a whole” (Chandler 2003, p. 33, referring to Beetham 1999). 
International human rights are a source of inspiration for proponents of cosmopolitan 
citizenship; human rights have been characterized as a form of universalized citizenship 
(Ruhs 2009, p. 7). As Anuscheh Farahat explains, “the legal principle of progressive 
inclusion emanates from the basic idea of the universal protection of human rights, i.e. 
the idea that individuals have rights independent from their location – whether they are in 
a home state or any other state” (Farahat 2009, p. 702). The legal principle of progressive 
inclusion is a prominent feature of the international human rights regime, which, 
according to Jean Cohen, constitutes “an international symbolic order, a political-cultural 
framework, and an institutional set of norms and rules for the global system that orients 
and constrains state” (Cohen 1999, p. 206). Cosmopolitan citizenship is no longer limited 
to the nation state, but instead attempts to use international human rights measures to 
develop an infrastructure of global citizenship that is more inclusive than national 
citizenship (Nash 2009, p. 1068). 
 One of the best-known proponents of cosmopolitan citizenship is Seyla Benhabib, 
who claims, with specific reference to Europe, that the international human rights have 
made citizenship increasingly cosmopolitan (Benhabib 2007). She argues that the 
proliferation and development of international human rights norms and institutions, 
which increasingly guide national institutions like constitutional courts and legislatures, 




citizenship and privilege of voting still remains, citizenship is no longer the basis for the 
right to have rights. According to her, citizenship understood as legal status has less 
salience than residency when it comes to claiming social rights in the European Union 
(Ibid).7 Citizenship has become uncoupled from the territory of the nation state as a basis 
for claims making.  
 
International Human Rights for Migrant Workers 
 Do international human rights specifically designed for migrant workers create a 
foundation for cosmopolitan citizenship? The most obvious distinction between the 
human rights and citizenship discourses is their territorial scope; while the boundaries of 
citizenship claims seem to contiguous with the nation state, human rights operate at a 
universal and international scale. However, upon closer examination, migrant workers 
disclose the boundaries of international human rights, which, in almost all instances with 
the exception of asylum seekers, stop at the territorial border of the nation state.  
 The United Nations (UN) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
advocate a rights-based approach to managing temporary migration programs, which 
embodies the principle of progressive inclusion that derives from the basic idea of the 
universal protection of human rights. The core notion is that migrants should be included 
within a host state by progressively granting them, on the basis of length of residence, 
contribution or social connection, the rights enjoyed by citizens in that country. The legal 
principle of progressive inclusion also reflects the position that rights should cross 
borders and be available to exercise against every state (Farahat 2009, p. 702). 
 However, as Farahat cautions, this is not the only principle that operates in the 
field of international law when it comes to migrant workers. It is in tension with an older, 
and very potent, principle, which he calls the principle of congruence between a state’s 
territory, authority and citizenry and to which I shall refer as the principle of state 
sovereignty. Farahat explains, “according to this principle, granting rights to non-citizens 
is always geared to the ideal image that the persons permanently living on a territory are 
– in reality – part of the citizenry of the state and subject to the state authority” (Ibid., p. 
706). 
 The tension between these two principles shape how international human rights 




state’s territory, the principle of state sovereignty is virtually untrammeled. According to 
the International Commission of Jurists, “as a general principle of international law, it is 
at the discretion of the State to grant entry to its territory to non-nationals” (Commission 
of International Jurists 2011, p. 43). There are, however, are some limited exceptions to 
the principle of state sovereignty, the strongest of which is international refugee law, over 
entry to its territory.8 Although the central obligation of receiving states is that of non-
refoulement – a commitment not to return an asylum seeker to a situation that threatens 
life and freedom – this principle has been interpreted by the authoritative body, the 
Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commission on Rights (UNHCR), as 
including an obligation on states to admit asylum seekers at least on a temporary basis so 
that a refugee determination can take place (Thomas 2011, p. 412). However, states are 
under no obligation to facilitate the arrival of asylum seekers at national borders. In fact, 
many states impose restrictions (like visas and carrier obligations) that create hurdles for 
asylum seekers to exercise their Geneva Convention on Refugee Rights.    
 International human rights instruments provide extremely limited incursions on a 
state’s right to exclude non-nationals. By contrast, human rights instruments place 
explicit limitations on a state’s right to prohibit a national from leaving the state’s 
territory. For example, the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights “recognizes the 
right of every person to leave any country, including his or her own, and the right of 
every person to return to her home country,” although “there is no corresponding right to 
enter or to stay or work in a third country” (Farahat 2009, p. 703).  
 Nevertheless, the absence of an international right to enter a state’s territory does 
not mean that there are no restrictions upon how a state exercises its sovereign right to 
control immigration. In exercising control over their borders, states must act in 
conformity with their international obligations. For example, even though the Racial 
Discrimination Convention permits states to make distinctions between citizens and non-
citizens, it has been interpreted as prohibiting racial discrimination in immigration criteria 
(Thomas 2011, p. 412).9  
 When we turn to human rights instruments specifically designed to protect 
migrant workers, the conflict between the principle of progressive inclusion and that of 
state sovereignty is particularly sharp.  In fact, as illustrated below, migrant workers’ 




restrictions on job mobility, social security, and family unification rights depending on 
the length of employment and residence” (Wickramasekara 2008, p. 1258). These 
restrictions on migrant workers’ rights are permitted because both the ILO and UN accept 
the principle of national sovereignty over immigration.  
 Since its founding in 1919, the ILO has been concerned about the protection of 
workers outside of their home country. During World War II, the problems of migrant 
workers were also given special mention in the Philadelphia Declaration. The ILO has 
two conventions specifically designed for migrant workers:  Convention 97, Migration 
for Employment (Revised), (1949), was adopted to deal with labour migration in post-war 
Europe, while Convention 143, Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) (1975), 
was designed for the construction boom that occurred in the Middle East as money and 
migrants flowed to that region after the 1973 oil-price hikes. Convention 97, and its 
accompanying Recommendation, aims to regulate the entire process of migration from 
entry to return. It also spells out procedures for private and public recruitment, and it 
encourages countries to sign bilateral agreements governing labour migration. Most 
importantly, it established the principle of equal treatment with national workers for 
migrant workers (Article 6). However, it applies only to regularly admitted migrants. 
Convention 143 extended the principle of equal treatment of migrant workers and 
addressed the growing problem of undocumented or illegal migration. Significantly, 
neither convention was designed to address the problems specific to temporary migration 
programs.   
 Both conventions adopt a broad definition of migrant worker; a “migrant worker” 
means “a person who migrates or who has migrated from one country to another with a 
view to being employed other than on his own account.”10 Convention 97 “requires that 
migrant workers be treated no less favorably than nationals in areas including pay, 
working hours, holidays with pay, apprenticeship and training, trade union membership 
and collective bargaining, and, with some limitations, social security” (International 
Labour Organization 2006, pp. 128-129) Convention 143 goes even further by requiring 
states to promote “equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and 
occupation, of social security, of trade union and cultural rights and of individual and 
collective freedoms” for migrant workers and their families (Article 11). 




Both Convention 97 and Convention 143 exclude frontier workers, seamen and members 
of the liberal professions and artists who are given permission to enter for an undefined 
short period.11 In addition, Convention 143 also excludes persons who enter specifically 
for purposes of training or education from the equal rights provided in Part II, although 
such workers are covered by other ILO conventions once they take up an employment 
relationship (Convention 143, Article 11(2 (d)). Migrant workers with special 
qualifications who go to a country to carry out specific short-term technical assignments 
(Convention 143, Article 11(2)(e)). Moreover, Convention 143 permits member states to 
restrict free choice of employment for lawfully resident migrant workers to a maximum 
of two years (Convention 143, Article 14(a)). 
 The ILO migrant worker conventions were the catalyst and model for the UN 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families (ICRMW).12 Rather than establish new rights, the ICRMW offers a more 
precise interpretation of human rights in the case of migrants (Antoine Pécoud and Paul 
de Guchteneire, 2006, p. 246, Weissbrodt, 2008, p. 186). However, the shift from the 
tripartite institution of the ILO to the UN, which is controlled exclusively by states, 
explains the “more state-centered ethos” of the UN convention (Cholewinski 2006, p. 
415). For example, Article 79 provides “nothing in the present Convention shall affect 
the right of each State Party to establish the criteria governing admissions of migrant 
workers and members of their families” (ICRMW, Article 79).  
 The major employment-related protections of the ICRMW are in Part III, 
particularly Articles 25-27, which prescribe equality in wages and working conditions for 
authorized and unauthorized migrant and national workers, allow migrants to join unions, 
and call for migrant workers to receive benefits under social security systems to which 
they contribute or to receive contributions upon departure. Authorized immigrants are 
covered by additional rights in Part IV, which include the right to information about jobs 
abroad as well as a list of “equal treatment” goals, including freedom of movement in the 
host country, and equal access to employment services, public housing, and educational 
institutions. 
 However, Part IV also provides for a number of restrictions on the rights of a 
range of migrant workers with limited residence and work authorizations. Like 




lawfully resident migrant workers to a maximum of two years (ICRMW, Article 52 
(3)(a)). Moreover, the rights of certain specific categories of temporary migrants, such as 
seasonal workers, project-tied workers or specified employment workers, are curtailed 
explicitly in Part V of the ICRMW or remain entirely unprotected. Under Part V, 
seasonal workers are limited to the rights provided under Part IV “that can be applied to 
them by reason of their presence and work in the territory of the State of employment and 
that are compatible with their status in the State as seasonal workers, taking into account 
the fact that they are present in the State for only part of the year” (ICRMW, Article 59 
(1)). Similarly, Part V excludes project-tied and specified-employment migrant workers 
from a range of rights in Part IV of the ICRMW, including free choice of employment 
(ICRMW, Article 61 and 62). Project-tied workers are also excluded from the rights in 
Articles 53-55 concerning equal treatment with national workers with respect to 
protection against dismissal and access to alternative employment in the event of loss or 
termination of work (ICRMW, Article 61(1)). 
 Although the migrant workers rights instruments purport to embrace the principle 
of equal treatment between migrant and national workers, they are perfectly compatible 
with the right of states to provide a range of different migrant statuses, some of which are 
very precarious, for workers they admit into their territory (Fudge 2012). What the 
instruments do is limit the length of time and the extent of the restrictions placed on 
migrant workers’ rights. They provide access to a tier of rights that depend upon type of 
occupation, the length of residency in the host country, and the type of immigration 
permit granted. International human rights instruments do not, in and of themselves, 
provide a basis for an inclusive cosmopolitan notion of citizenship; as Lydia Morris 
notes, they “offer no obvious means of addressing the different legal statuses occupied by 
noncitizens or the stratified nature of their rights” (Morris 2003, p. 79).   
 Not only do the international human rights instruments that are specifically 
designed for migrant workers contemplate a range of different migrant statuses that 
correspond to different employment-related and residence-related rights, the mechanisms 
for enforcing them are weak. Few states have ratified either of the ILO’s migrant workers 
conventions and even fewer have ratified the ICMWR.13 The ILO’s migrant workers 
conventions provide, through the ILO’s general supervisory machinery, an individual-




the soft (shaming) rather than hard (penalty) variety (Rodgers, Swepston and Van Daele 
2009). By contrast, even though the ICRMW contemplates that inter-state and individual 
complaint can be brought to the Committee established pursuant to the Convention, too 
few states (despite the low threshold of ten that was set) have made the relevant 
declarations to make the Committee competent for such monitoring (Noll 2010, 255).  
 The problem is that “human rights norms cannot … ease the spectre of the 
territorial border and the significance of citizenship and immigration status for both 
entitlement to, and the enjoyment of human rights” (Kesby 2012, p. 116). These 
limitations in human rights instruments for migrant workers call into question the utility 
of human rights discourse as a normative vocabulary and institutional assemblage for 
achieving improved working and living conditions for migrant workers.  In their critique 
of the “ideology of temporary labour migration in the post-global era,” two legal 
scholars, Catherine Dauvergne and Sarah Marsden, argue that “rights solutions can only 
ever be partially successful because the condition of temporary migrant work is anchored 
in a fundamental subordination” which they identify as the “right of the state to exclude 
non-members as an aspect of sovereignty. This exclusion power undermines attempts to 
articulate rights claims for those with any type of temporary status, and reinforces a 
fundamental inequality between citizens and non-citizenship” (Dauvergne and Marsden 
2012, p. 22). They invoke Hannah Arendt’s conception of citizenship as “the right to 
have rights” to illustrate the inability of rights claims to get to the root of the problem for 
migrant workers – their lack of citizenship (Ibid 23 citing Arendt 1951).  
 
II. Citizenship. Human Rights and Migrant Workers 
 It is important to explore Dauvergne and Marsden’s use of Arendt’s conception of 
citizenship to lodge a fundamental critique against human rights as an emancipatory 
normative discourse for migrant workers. Not only is their critique important in its own 
right, it exemplifies a strand of argumentation within political theory, and increasingly 
within legal scholarship, that challenges the very universality of human rights protection, 
typically drawing on the example of the stateless person or refugee, in order to 
problematize claims to an universal entitlement to human rights regardless of civic 
membership. The widely accepted point of departure of this debate on the “right to have 




significant is how recent scholars had expanded the Arendt’s critique of human rights that 
centred on the stateless to migrant workers, leading some like Dauvergne and Marsden, 
conclude that cosmopolitan or global citizenship is a better discourse than human rights 
for expressing the claims of migrant workers.   
 Referring to Arendt’s 1958 book, The Human Condition, Dauvergne and Marsden 
claim that Arendt’s contrast of “citizenship, not with non-citizenship, but with slavery” 
…  “could have been tailored to the condition of the temporary migrant worker” 
(Dauvergne and Marsden 2012, p. 24, Arendt 1958, p. 217). They quote Arendt’s 
assertion that “the chief difference between slave and modern, free labour is not that the 
labourer possesses personal freedom – freedom of movement, economic activity, and 
personal inviolability – but that he is admitted to the political realm and full 
emancipa[tion] as a citizen” (Dauvergne and Marsden 2012, p. 24). They interpret 
Arendt, who follows Marx in this respect, as claiming that “free wage labour” is, in fact, 
a form of unfreedom since economic necessity requires human beings to sell their labour  
(power) in order to subsist. However, they claim that Arendt offers an additional 
conceptual insight for understanding the specific subordination of migrant workers. Here 
they refer to Arendt’s analogy between the “labouring classes” prior to the abolition of 
the property requirement for voting rights and “resident aliens” (Ibid.). Building on 
Arendt’s insight, Dauvergne and Marsden suggest that economic necessity compels 
people to become migrant workers who lack citizenship rights in the state in which they 
work. Thus, they conclude, “insofar as the main proxy for membership is the formulation 
of the worker as labour in a free market through an employment relationship, categorical 
unfreedom for the migrant worker is implied in the basic terms of the relationship” 
(Ibid.). Since unfreedom in the sense of exclusion from the political community of the 
nation state is a basic condition of the migrant worker, rights will only palliate, but not 
resolve, the essential problem. Invoking Arendt again, they claim that in the 
contemporary “post-global era, where the forces of globalization have become part of the 
backdrop to our social and political reality” citizenship must move into the global realm 
(Ibid., p. 25).    
 Are migrant workers unfree because they lack citizenship rights in the host 
country in which they are working? Martin Gibney (2009) describes non-citizens, who he 




Hannah Arendt so eloquently described in the late 1940s in her work, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism.” He goes on to explain that “in Origins, Arendt described the stateless, a 
category which for her included refugees, as ‘the most symptomatic group in 
contemporary politics’ because their dire plight revealed the emptiness of human rights 
(what she called the Rights of Man) for those who lacked effective or formal membership 
in an actual nation state community” (Ibid., p. 3). While Gibney acknowledges these 
migrants “are rarely formally stateless and are, in many cases, not refugees,” the problem 
is that they “lack security, basic civil, political and economic rights, and opportunities in 
the countries to which they have migrated. Their day to day experience may involve a 
kind of statelessness in the sense of an effective absence from state protection that is 
linked to their being outside the country of the citizenship” (Ibid.).  
 Gibney is building on Arendt’s important insight that membership in a political 
community is critical to the enjoyment and exercise of rights in an international order 
based on state sovereignty over territory. Moreover, he considers the practical 
significance of citizenship. He is careful to distinguish citizenship as a form of social 
entitlement, which, in many (liberal democratic) countries has expanded to include 
residents, from citizenship as a legal status. As a legal status, citizenship is the formal 
status of membership in the state, or nationality as understood in international law, and 
typically encompasses the right to enter and to remain in the territory, access assistance 
and diplomatic protection, and the franchise (Macklin 2007). Gibney (2009, p.6) 
helpfully identifies what he characterizes as two major goods associated with citizenship 
as a legal status: voice, the right to participate in the political life of a community, and 
security, the right to entry and to remain in a territory and to seek consular services when 
abroad.  
 Although the concept of citizenship is frequently used in discussing the 
disadvantaged position of migrant workers, the problem with this term is that it 
encompasses too much. Citizenship is used to refer to both the nation state’s power to 
exclude migrants (either by refusing entry or via deportation) from its territory and the 
entitlements that accrue to migrants once they are working in the territory of the host 
state. Gibney uses the term “precarious residents” to refer to people living in a state in 
which they possess few social, political or economic rights, are highly vulnerable to 




However, this term, too, lacks precision. While all residents who do not have ether 
permanent residency status or citizenship are, to some extent, precarious, some migrant 
statuses are much more precarious than others (Morris 2003).  The different migrant 
statuses are important in channeling migrant workers into different labour market 
locations. For example, entry to Canada as a high-skilled migrant worker provides a 
range of rights, such as family accompaniment and a clear path to permanent residence, 
that is simply not available to migrant who is admitted as a seasonal agricultural worker 
(Fudge and MacPhail 2009; Fudge 2012). The concept of migrant status allows for a 
range of different migrant statuses that differ in terms of rights and entitlements and, 
especially, the right to stay in the host country.  
 The concept of migrant status has the added benefit of enabling us to be more 
precise about the different modalities and degrees of unfreedom at play in the preceding 
discussion of migrant workers. Sociologists have developed the concept of unfree labour 
to describe migrant workers who are not free to circulate in the labour markets of the host 
countries in which they are working (Miles 1987; Satzewich 1991; Basok 2002). This 
understanding of unfree labour has its origins in Marx’s central idea that the working 
class was formed as peasants (the paradigmatic agricultural workers) were detached from 
the land (Marx 2008). This detachment resulted in a dynamic, contradictory, double sense 
of freedom; workers were free of the land, in the sense that they no longer had customary 
rights to work it and subsist on it, and they were also free of the demands imposed by 
lords and masters who exercised direct proprietorial rights over their labour (Cohen 2006, 
p. 12).  
 Influenced by Hegel’s association of the freedom of the subject with the ability to 
engage in the exchange of property (which included, for Hegel, her own productive 
capacity), Marx defined labour power as a commodity (Brass 2011). The freedom to 
circulate in the labour market and to sell their labour power to a number of different 
employers was the hallmark of the “free” labour of wage earners. But, in his dialectical 
understanding of labour, Marx highlighted the fundamental tension at the heart of 
capitalist social relations: that workers are free insofar as they have the capacity to sell 
their labour as a commodity, and unfree insofar as they are compelled to do so in order to 
sustain themselves. This tension is also at the heart of attempts to define and regulate 




of how Arendt uses unfreedom in Dauvergne and Marsden’s discussion of her work in 
the context of migrant workers. However, both they and Gibney also invoke the second 
sense that Arendt uses unfreedom, which is to capture the absence of political status of 
the slave in the Greek demos or the stateless person in the Westphalian international 
order. Because migrant workers lack political membership in the state in which they work 
they are unfree. 
 The problem with this invocation of Arendt’s discussion of unfreedom in the 
context of migrant workers is that it over-eggs-the-pudding; the expansion of unfreedom 
to the political sphere simultaneously obscures, and diminishes, how unfreedom operates 
in labour markets. It also assumes that migrants ought to be recognized as members of 
every political community in which they reside.  
 There are many forms unfreedom – or labour control – in the labour market, 
ranging form chattel slavery, serfdom, debt bondage and contract labour – that can be 
placed along a continuum of exploitation (Skrivankova 2010). Dimensions of 
freedom/unfreedom include personal (including psychological) integrity, personal self-
determination, political self-determination, the right to circulate in the labour market, the 
right to choose one’s residence, and the right to seek legal redress. Each of these 
dimensions is shaped by both de jure and de facto factors. It is important to be precise 
about where a particular form of labour control falls along the continuum and whether the 
dimensions of unfreedom are de jure or de facto since how we characterize the problem 
of unfreedom will influence how we attempt to resolve it.  
 Temporary migrant workers who are part of managed migration programs are not 
free to circulate in labour markets in the host country in which they work. Many have de 
jure employment rights, but are de facto unable to exercise them. But, treating all migrant 
workers as a unified category of precarious residents obscures the extent to which 
different migrant statuses and different social locations endow migrants with different 
entitlements and capacities to exercise them.  
 Nor are migrant worker generally free to vote in host-country elections. However, 
the majority of them are not slaves; they can, despite hardship, return to their home 
countries and they can exercise their citizenship rights there. Not only does the analogy 
with slavery obscure the real problems with temporary migration regimes, it also denies 




countries, choose to cross borders in order to attempt to improve their (or their families’) 
life prospects.  
 
Disaggregating the Dimensions of Citizenship 
  For Arendt, citizenship, understood as membership in a political community, was 
the essential basis for rights. Her experience of statelessness after Work War II 
demonstrated to her that human right are “impotent at the moment of their greatest need’ 
(Kesby 2012, 1). The absence of a political community to guarantee human rights made 
such rights worse than hollow for Arendt. The plight of the stateless revealed the 
“perplexities” of human rights (Arendt 2004, p 290); reduced to the status of “being 
humans in general” and stripped of all the political and legal entitlements of citizenship, 
the stateless are rightless (Ibid., p. 302). According to Arendt (2004, p. 296-7), “we 
became aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a 
framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to belong to 
some kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerged who had lost 
and could not regain these rights because of the new global political situation.” The right 
to have right to have rights is the right to be a citizen, which is to be a member of a 
political community.  
 This conception of the right to have rights is shaped by Arendt’s republican 
notion of politics and her Aristotelian understanding of human nature. She saw humans as 
essentially political beings, deriving dignity from speech and action (Kesby 2012, p. 4; 
Schaap 2011, p. 26). This emphasis on politics helps to explain why Arendt saw the 
slaves of classical Greece, who could not participate in the demos of the polis, as 
exemplifying unfreedom. It also explains why she has little interest in the social (or 
private)  sphere, which she regards as a place of inequality, and those who must toil in 
household or economy (Schaap 2011, p. 32). For Arendt, freedom, equality, and rights 
derived from republican citizenship.  
 It is useful to interrogate the conception of citizenship underpinning Arendt’s 
conception of the right to have rights. The concept citizenship is generally agreed as 
having three distinct components: the political principle of democracy, the juridical status 
of legal personhood, and the social status of membership (Cohen 1999, p.248). Cohen 




and do come into conflict, and that every historical synthesis entails a set of political 
choices and tradeoffs that tend to be forgotten once a conception becomes hegemonic” 
(Ibid., p. 248). She explains that the democratic conception of citizenship that puts 
political equality and participation at its centre is also particularizing and exclusionary; it 
is narrower than the second component of citizenship, which is the juridical conception. 
In this conception, the citizen is the legal person who is free to act by law and expect the 
law’s protection. This component is inherently universal, and, according to Cohen, “it is 
on this basis that transnational or global citizenship is at least conceivable” (Ibid., p. 249). 
However, the very universality of the juridical component tends to depoliticize and 
undermine solidarity. It is in tension not only with the democratic component, it also fits 
uneasily with the membership component, which like the democratic component is also 
exclusionary. Cohen emphasizes the  “’elective affinity’ between a strong democratic 
stress on citizenship as the self-rule of a sovereign demos (which presupposes 
membership) and a communitarian stress on belonging and identity” (Ibid., p. 250). 
 Cohen argues that the three elements of the citizenship principle appeared to map 
congruently onto each other in the terrain of the constitutional, national, territorial, and 
welfare state. Using T. H. Marshall’s conception of citizenship as the modern paradigm, 
Cohen claims that he fore grounded the juridical component but linked it to the principle 
of equality in ways that promoted social integration and inclusion. The underlying 
tension between juridical component and democratic component was easy to ignore so 
long as the “cultural identity of the demos [was] construed as a nation,” but, if, as Cohen 
suggests, attention shifts from Marshall’s focus on the substantive rights of citizenship … 
to the formal dimension of membership’ then citizenship becomes an instrument of social 
closure and exclusion (Ibid., p. 253). The background presumption of this hegemonic or 
paradigmatic conception is that citizenship involves membership in a sovereign, 
territorial nation-state within a system of states. Here Arendt’s insight that “the 
attribution of exclusive territoriality and inviolable sovereignty to each nation state over 
internal matters contributed to the willingness of states to deprive non-citizens of basic 
rights and to threaten the rights of national minorities, even if they were citizens” is 
crucial (Ibid., p. 253).  
 However, Arendt’s solution to the problem of the exclusive notion of membership 




citizenship on legal criteria for national identity, misses what Cohen identifies as the 
crucial dilemma, viz., that the three components of citizenship are in essential tension and 
cannot be resolved at the same institutional level. According to Cohen, the democratic 
component of citizenship, not only the membership component, is in tension with the 
juridical conception even within a liberal constitutional democracy because the 
democratic conception requires the identification of a defined demos.  It entails a 
distinction between members and non-members. Who belongs to the demos cannot be 
democratically determined. 
 For Cohen, there is no easy solution to this dilemma; “democracy cannot 
guarantee justice, but neither can moral justification appeal to some absolute truth that 
exists independently of consensus” (Cohen 1999, p. 265). However, it is possible to 
minimize the tensions between the components by disaggregating them and 
institutionalizing them at different levels. Cohen argues that “the starting point for a 
disaggregated model of citizenship and the imperative behind the articulation of universal 
rights of persons is the presence of large numbers of non-citizens in most countries and 
hence the impossibility of pretending that all of those subject to or affected by the law 
(given interdependency) are also its authors” (Ibid., p. 264). Thus, while membership in 
the demos must be limited in order to keep it active and vital, everyone has the right to 
citizenship understood as political participation somewhere. Migrant workers may not 
have the right to vote in their host state, but, in most cases, they enjoy the democratic 
political component of citizenship in their home state. The right to be a citizen 
somewhere, however, does not entail the right to be a citizen everywhere. Nor does it 
preclude the right of non-citizens to have their personhood respected everywhere. The 
democratic component of citizenship does not need to be coterminous with the juridical 
component in order to achieve just social relations.  
 The various components of citizenship need to be disaggregated and 
institutionalized at a number of different levels. The critical question is to distinguish “the 
set of rights that should belong to citizens as a members of a discrete polity, the rights 
associated with residence, and the rights that should belong to everyone” (Ibid., p. 262). 
Resident migrant workers should not only enjoy the same labour and employment rights 
as host state nationals (or citizens), they should have access to effective enforcement 




state and, perhaps, at the sub-national level. Migrant workers might also need specialized 
expedited dispute resolution mechanisms to enforce their work related rights given the 
temporary nature of their residence. Portable provisions for social benefits and 
remittances may be important for migrant workers, and such provisions would need to 
institutionalized beyond the nation state at the bilateral or transnational level. Justice for 
migrant workers might better be furthered by providing them with special rights that 
reflect their social location simultaneously in two states rather than providing them with 
the formal political rights available to citizens in host states (Ottonelli and Torresi 2012, 
pp. 220-221). Institutionalizing the different components at different levels would help to 
counteract the different modalities and degrees of unfreedom to which migrant workers 
are subjected.  
 International human rights discourses provide an important resource for 
deepening and disaggregating the juridical component of citizenship from the other two 
components. It is precisely the openness and indeterminacy of human rights discourse 
that makes human rights a momentum concept par excellence (Cohen 1999, 262). There 
is, contrary to what Dauvergne and Marsden claim, no ineluctable directionality or 
ideology to human rights (Dauvergne and Marsden 2012, pp.22-23). Human rights do not 
inevitably run up against the borders of nation states. Sometimes they are invoked by 
national courts and elected officials within the territory of the nation state (Benhabib 
2007, p. 33). As Benhabib notes, “the paradoxes of the right to have rights are 
ameliorated by those who exercise their democratic-republican rights with or without the 
correct papers” (Ibid., p. 30).14  
 However, what is significant about human rights is not the fact that courts and 
other state institutions recognize them, but, rather, that subordinated groups actively 
claim them. It is helpful to see human rights as an activity and a practice, with human 
rights functioning as a generative principle with an emancipatory logic (Ingram 2008, p. 
411). Human rights are a momentum concept, they are actively claimed by migrant 
workers, and it is the act of claiming, and not the claim’s recognition, that is important. 
Here Jacques Rancière’s critique of Arendt’s problematic in her discussion of the right to 
have rights is instructive.15  
 Rancière takes issue with Arendt’s understanding of the political subject – the 




realm of necessity,” politics is the contested  border between the sphere of citizenship and 
political life and the sphere of private life (Rancière 2004, p. 303). Just at the this border 
is constituted through contestation, for Rancière the political subject is fluid, constituted 
in a process of “subjectivization” (Ibid.). Andrew Schaap nicely captures how Rancière 
cuts through Arendt’s perplexity over the “Rights of Man” 
Following Arendt’s analysis, the Rights of Man must belong either to “those who 
have no rights” (the human as such) or to “those who have rights” (citizens).  
Instead, Rancière suggests “the Rights of Man are the rights of those who have 
not the rights that they have and have the rights they have not” (Rancière 2004, 
302).  On this account the subject of human rights emerges through political 
action and speech that seeks to verify the existence of those rights that are 
inscribed within the self-understanding of the political community. In doing so, 
political subjects demonstrate the reality of both their equality as speaking 
animals and of their inequality within the social order (Schaap 2011, 34 emphasis 
in original). 
The subject of human rights is neither the human of the Rights of Man nor the citizen of 
the political community, but the collective subject who invokes the rights inscribed in 
human rights instruments and challenges the gap between human and citizen (Kesby 
2012, 124). It is by exploiting the interval between these statuses that the political subject 
is born.  By challenging the common sense that excludes them from the political sphere, 
migrant workers enact a scene of dissensus, which brings the inequality of the social 
sphere into collision with the equality inscribed in human rights instruments (Rancière 
2004, p. Kesby 2012, 126).16 
 What is important for Rancière is not, as it is for Arendt, that the claiming subject 
be recognized as an equal by the political community, but that the claim be asserted.  As 
Schaap (2011, p. 35 emphasis in original) explains, “the political is constituted when 
those who are not qualified to participate in politics presume to act and speak as if they 
are.” The significance of international human rights for migrant workers is that they are 
taken up and used by migrant workers to assert their equality with citizens. On this 
reading, human rights are neither the emanations of powerful institutions that govern 
from above nor moral imperatives that can easily slide into paternalism; they are 




Ingram (2008, p. 413), “the politics of human rights is a creative, democratic politics of 
contestation, challenging particular exclusions and inequalities in the name of the open-
ended principle of equal freedom, which acquires its particular contours only through this 
contestation” (Ibid., 413). The meaning of human rights for migrant workers is not 
predetermined; it is shaped by the global political economy and contested by subaltern 
agents and their advocates.  
 
Conclusion 
 Migrant workers exemplify the limits of human rights instruments, which 
recognize the authority of nation states to control entrance to their territory, the 
competing demands and tensions between the different components of citizenship, and 
the need for a political understanding of the significance of human rights. In order to 
minimize the enduring tension between justice and democracy it helps to disaggregate the 
different components of citizenship. Human rights claims are a resource for expanding 
the juridical component of citizenship. Equal legal status is an important, albeit not 
sufficient, condition of full citizenship. Migrant workers and their advocates can use 
international human rights instruments to makes political claims.  However, it is unlikely 
that global citizenship will simply be a form of national citizenship writ large; instead, it 
is likely to require the institutionalization of a different set of rights at a range of different 
levels.  
 Human rights do not provide a royal road to justice.  They play an “ambiguous 
role” in the contemporary political economy; “the uneven application of human rights 
law combined with existing social and economic inequalities between citizens and non-
citizens” can result in a “proliferation of statuses regarding citizenship and human rights 
rather than an equalization of treatment for citizens and non-citizens” (Nash 2009, 
p.1079). But, the problem is that there is no easy alternative. Citizenship discourse, even 
if articulated at the global level, does not offer a more secure path to justice. The 
democratic component of citizenship can be corroded by money, membership can be 
narrowed by the resurgence of nationalistic populism, and Marshallian conceptions of 
social citizenship can be hollowed out by austerity-driven reregulation of labour markets 
and the contraction of social services.  All solutions are contingent and reversible. What 




citizenship, which was tethered to the nation state, and to embrace a variety of tools, 
including human rights, to contest the various of forms of unfreedom that subordinate 
workers in a globalized world.  
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1 I am using the term ‘migrant worker’ to refer to workers employed in Canada who hold  
temporary visas but who do have Canadian citizenship or permanent residency (landed 
immigrant status).  
2 Low-skilled work refers to work performed by workers whose skills and qualifications 
are not recognized by the host or receiving country. 
3 In many countries (like Canada), low-skilled workers are not entitled to the same rights 
as high-skilled workers. 
4 I appreciate that this focus excludes undocumented or irregular migrant workers and 
that regular status can become irregular and that what may initially be temporary 
residence may become more permanent. 
5 For a discussion of irregular workers see Krause 2008; Frank 2011.  
6 Not all concepts are so neatly categorized; for example, democracy is likely to a 
momentum concept, whereas liberalism, because of the commitment to property rights, is 
not (Hoffman 2004, p. 12). 
7 Benhabib (2007, 28) recognizes that cosmopolitan conceptions of citizenship have more 
purchase in some regions than in other, contrasting the increasing cosmopolitanism of the 
EU with the “unilateral reassertion of sovereignty of the US.” 
8 There is a limited obligation on states to permit migrants to enter a state’s territory if it 
is necessary for purposes of family reunification. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 137(July 28, 19510 (the Refugee Convention). There is a limited 
obligation on states to permit migrants to enter a state’s territory if it is necessary for 
purposes of family reunification. 
9 The Human Rights Committee, which monitors the International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights, recognizes the rights of State parties to decide in principle who enters 
their borders, but requires that this right should not be exercised in a discriminatory 
manner.  
10  See Article 11 in each convention.  
11 See Article 11(2) (b) in both conventions.  
12 General Assembly Resolution 45/158 of 18 December 1990. The Convention came 
into effect on 1 July 2003. It took 13 years to receive the twenty ratifications required to 
bring the Convention into force.  
13 As of June 9, 2012, 49 countries had ratified Convention 97, while only 23 had ratified 
Convention 143.  At the same time, there were only 34 signatories to the ICRMW, of 
which only two (Mexico and Turkey) were members of the OECD.  
14 There are several different interpretations of how to deal with the Arendt’s paradox of 
the right to have rights.  Benhabib (2004) stresses the distinction between a moral and a 
legal right.  Some commentators try to minimize the Aristotelian foundations of Arendt in 
order to provide a reading of the practice of human rights that is compatible with 
Rancière.  For a discussion of these nuances see Kesby 2011, p. 120-121; Schaap 2012; 
Ingram 2008.  Following Schaap, I keep the contrast between Rancière and Arendt stark.  
15 There is a growing and rich literature on Arendt’s right to have rights, and I have been 
selective in my reference to it.  See Kesby 2012, Schaap 2011, Barbour 2012, Bohman 
2012; Besson 2012 for references and discussions.    
16 Dissensus is the activity of highlighting the disagreement between the common sense 
world where equality and rights are denied with the claim by the excluded that they are 
equal and have rights, see Kesby 2012, p. 125; Rancière 2004, p. 305-6.	
  	
  	
  
